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Abstract 
The Euclidean representation of political issues and alternative outcomes, and 
the associated representation of preferences as quasi-concave utility functions is by 
now a staple of formal models of committees and elections. This theoretical 
development, moreover, is accompanied by a considerable body of experimental research. 
We can view that research in two ways: as a test of the basic propositions about 
equilibria in specific institutional settings, and as an attempt to gain insights into 
those aspects of political processes that are poorly understood or imperfectly 
modeled, such as the robustness of theoretical results with respect to procedural 
details and bargaining environments. This essay reviews that research so that we can 
gain some sense of its overall import. 
A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees 
A considerable body of political theory represents alternative outcomes or 
policies by a subset of n-dimensional Euclidean space, and assumes that we can 
represent individual preferences over these outcomes by quasi-concave utility 
functions with internal satiation points. By imposing this particular structure on 
alternatives and preferences, we can deduce a variety of substantively informative 
results, such as the Median Voter Theorem in elections and the generic emptiness of 
cores in cooperative political games (cf. Plott 1967, Schofield 1983). 
Correspondingly, the special case of Euclidean preferences, introduced by Davis and 
Hinich (1966, 1968), form the basis for the most extensively developed models of two 
general classes of political institutions -- elections and committees. Although 
Euclidean preferences do not necessarily yield the most general models, they allow 
us to formulate estimatable statistical models of preference parameters (see Enelow 
and Hinich 1985 for a general survey). Furthermore, with them we secure a benchmark 
against which to compare other theoretical results, especially those that concern 
the relative importance and impact of alternative institutions in the determination 
of outcomes (cf. Kramer 1972; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Riker 1984). 
This latter issue about the effects of alternative institutional structures is 
the take-off point for the literature this essay reviews -- experimental research on 
spatial models. Briefly, we can view that research, commencing with Fiorina and 
Plott's (1978) experiments on committee decision making, in two ways. On the one 
hand, we can interpret it as testing the basic propositions that such models offer 
about equilibrium outcomes in two specific institutions -- two-candidate, majority 
rule elections and n-person, majority-rule committees. Since an important part of 
this theoretical research consists of ascertaining the impact of procedures such as 
the requirement of unusual majorities, issue-by-issue voting, and agendas, 
experimental research seeks to test the related theoretical propositions. On the 
other hand, we can view experimentation as providing insight into those aspects of 
political processes that are poorly understood or imperfectly modeled, such as the 
robustness of theoretical results with respect to particular procedural details and 
nuances in bargaining environments. This essay reviews that literature so that we 
can gain a clearer sense of the role of specific experiments with respect to these 
two views. 
I. The Basic Theoretical Structure and Results 
We begin by introducing some notation that allows us to formulate the central 
theoretical results of spatial models about Condorcet winners. These results are 
the focus of nearly all experimental research that we review. Briefly, if we let X 
f:;; Rm denote the set of feasible alternative outcomes (usually a closed and convex 
set, such as the set that corresponds to a budget constraint), and N = {1,2, . . .  ,n} 
the set of voters or committee members, then the associated utility function for 
person iEN, ui:X->R, is written as a function of x = (x1,x2,. .. ,xm), with the
understanding that ui(x) is characterized in particular by the ideal point of person 
i, x•i = (x*i1,x*i2, ... ,x*im) E X. 
Although theoretical results that seek generality impose the weakest 
assumptions possible on ui, experimental research is facilitated if intuitively 
simple forms are used. Hence, the majority of experimental research proceeds by 
using the Euclidean metric. Briefly, if A is a symmetric, positive-definite matrix,
then, ui(x) = -(x*i - x)A(x*i - x)'. In this instance, i's indifference contours in 
X are concentric ellipses, where A determines the specific form and orientation of
those ellipses. If A is a diagonal matrix (aij = 0 for all i * j), then a 
transformation of the axes renders A equal to the identity matrix I, u;(x) becomes 
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the simple distance metric, and indifference contours are circles. In anticipation 
of some experimental results that we review, we note that one alternative to this 
formulation is the city block metric, defined by u;(x) = -I: I x*ii - xj I· In this 
case, indifference contours over X are concentric squares, with diagonals parallel 
to the coordinates of X. 
From the perspective of experimental research, the most relevant theoretical 
results concern the conditions for the existence of Condorcet winners -- outcomes 
that defeat all other alternatives in X in a majority vote. We cannot review that 
research in detail here. However, we should cite Plott's (1967) result for general 
quasi-concave and continuous preferences. If the number of voters is odd and if at 
most one person's ideal is at the presumed Condorcet point, then Plott gives 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of that point in terms of the 
pairwise symmetry of voter utility gradients. This result shows that the existence 
of a Condorcet point is rare in multidimensional issue
' 
spaces. Indeed, if utility 
functions are everywhere differentiable, then generically Condorcet winners do not 
generically exist (Schofield 1983). 
Despite these results, we can construct preference configurations that yield a 
Condorcet winner, and this theoretical research is an especially useful starting 
point for experimental research. In one dimension, Plott's symmetry condition 
reduces to Black's (1962) theorem, which is that if utility functions are single­
peaked (strictly quasi-concave) and if the number of voters is odd, then the 
Condorcet winner exists and corresponds to the electorate's median ideal point. If 
the number of voters is even or if utility functions have "flat peaks," then a 
Condorcet winner may not exist, but there will exist a set of alternatives that 
cannot be defeated in a majority rule vote, called the majority rule core. In 
multiple dimensions when all voters have preferences based on Euclidean distance, 
3 
the symmetry conditions for a Condorcet point are equivalent to the results of 
Davis, Degroot and Hinich (1972), who show that a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the existence of a Condorcet point is that there exist a median in all 
directions. Given this requirement's fragility, this also shows that Condorcet 
winners are rare. With respect to city-block preferences, the existence of a 
Condorcet winner is assured, but only if the dimensionality of X is one or two (Rae 
and Taylor 1971). 
To interpret experimental results correctly, however, it is important to 
understand that establishing an alternative as a Condorcet winner is not equivalent 
to predicting that alternative as the eventual outcome. The definition of the 
Condorcet winner refers only to a property of the social preference relation under 
pairwise voting and simple majority rule, and the social scientist's interest in it 
stems from the implicit judgement that if such a winner exists, then collective 
decision-making institutions ought to select it, whereas if an institution does not 
select it, then we ought to have good reasons for regarding the outcomes that are 
selected as legitimate social choices. Thus, our research typically begins with the
question: Does institution _ yield the Condorcet winner as the eventual outcome if 
such a winner exists, and what kind of outcomes does this institution yield if there 
is no Condorcet winner? 
Most theoretical and experimental research about voting, committees, and 
legislatures seek answers to this question. Hence, an important part of that 
research is the specification of the situation being modeled in such a way that we 
link individual decisions and collective outcomes to the concept of the Condorcet 
winner. This means that before making any prediction we must look at the game-form 
implied by the specific institutions that society uses to choose outcomes -- the 
strategies available to decision makers and the preferences over these strategies 
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implied by preferences over outcomes in X. 
This approach yields the principal, descriptive reason for interest in the 
concept of a Condorcet winner -- namely, the apparent variety of game-forms that 
render such winners predicted outcomes. Two important game-forms are two-candidate 
elections and n-person cooperative committees. With respect to elections, if X 
denotes the strategy spaces of each of two candidates who are competing for 
electoral victory under simple majority rule, if N is the set of voters, if all 
voters have perfect information about the candidates' strategies, if candidates have 
perfect information about voter preferences, and if all persons vote for the 
candidate whose strategy they most prefer, then a Condorcet winner, if it exists, is 
the unique Nash equilibrium strategy for both candidates in the corresponding two­
candidate, zero sum game. With respect to cooperative committees, if N denotes the 
members of a committee that must choose an alternative in X, if the committee uses 
simple majority rule, and if the strategic character of procedures are described by 
a characteristic-function representation in which majority coalitions can secure 
anything in X and all other coalitions can secure nothing, then the Condorcet winner 
corresponds to the game's core -- to an outcome that no coalition has the means or 
the desire to upset. 
Similar analysis also establishes the Condorcet winner as the predicted outcome 
for other institutional arrangements. For example, if a committee or legislature 
proceeds by an agenda in which alternatives or amendments to the status quo can be 
considered only "issue-by-issue," and if preferences correspond to unweighted 
Euclidean distance (A = I), then, regardless of whether voters act strategically or 
nonstrategically (in the sense of always choosing sincerely), the unique stable 
outcome is the one that corresponds to the median preference on every issue -- the 
issue-by-issue median (if we look only at committees in which all members always 
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vote sincerely, we can drop the requirement that A equal I to establish that a 
stable outcome exists, cf. Kramer 1972, but see Enelow and Hinich, 1983, for an 
analysis with uncertainty). Since Condorcet winners, if they exist, must correspond 
to a median in all directions, issue-by-issue voting yields Condorcet winners as 
eventual outcomes. 
Not all game forms, however, imply the selection of Condorcet winners. If all 
voters are sincere, if one voter is exogenously selected as an agenda setter, and if 
this agenda setter can form an agenda of any type over a part of the feasible set 
(in this instance, a finite subset of Rm), then even if the Condorcet winner appears 
on the agenda, nearly any alternative can be made to prevail. On the other hand, if 
all voters are sophisticated in the sense that they look ahead to final consequences 
and vote accordingly, and if a Condorcet winner is on the agenda, then that winner 
will be selected (see Ordeshook and Schwartz 1987 for a review of these results and 
Levine and Plott, 1977, for some experimental verification). With respect to 
elections, if three or more candidates compete under plurality rule, then in even if 
the election concerns a single issue, the Condorcet winner generally is not an 
equilibrium strategy for any candidate -- equilibrium strategies, if they exist, are 
lotteries (mixed strategies) over a subset of the issue space (Cox 1986). 
These results leave us with five questions -- three theoretical and two 
experimental. The first experimental question is straightforward: If a Condor�et
winner exists and if a game-form predicts that winner as the outcome, will it be 
selected? The theoretical questions engendered by these results are, first, if a 
Condorcet winner does not exist, what outcomes should we predict; second, what role 
does the concept of a Condorcet winner play in alternative institutional 
arrangements (under alternative game-forms); and what solution hypotheses are 
appropriate for games with empty cores or for game-forms that fail to yield a 
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plausible noncooperative equilibrium? The subsidiary experimental question is: What 
support can we find for theoretical extensions, and how might experimental research 
suggest viable theoretical approaches? 
These questions organize the experimental research that we review. First, with 
respect to committees, that research includes: 
1. testing the core (Condorcet winner) as a predictor in cooperative 
committee processes; 
2. testing the robustness of the core with respect to variations in 
procedures; 
Second, with respect to two-candidate elections and the relevance of Condorcet 
winners to final outcomes; 
3. ascertaining whether candidates converge to Condorcet winners in two­
candidate elections. 
4. ascertaining whether candidates converge to Condorcet winners when the 
information of candidates and of voters is incomplete. 
Third, with respect to situations in which preferences are configured so that no 
Condorcet winner describes the social preference order under simple majority rule; 
5. identifying possible bounds on the strategies of election candidates, 
such as those hypothesized by concepts like the uncovered set; 
6. developing and testing alternative cooperative solution hypotheses, such 
as the Competitive Solution. 
7. ascertaining the circumstance under which alternative procedural 
restrictions, such as issue-by-issue voting or the requirement of 
unusual majorities, induce equilibria; 
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2. Condorcet Winners in Simple Committees 
The seminal experimental essay dealing with spatial preferences is Fiorina and 
Plott's (1978) study of cooperative committees. Using the configuration of ideal 
points (xl' ... ,x5) shown in Figure l a  and a payoff structure that induces circular
indifference contours so that the ideal point of voter 5 is a Condorcet point, the 
broad outline of their procedure is as follows: Beginning with a status quo point 
(the extreme upper-right corner of the grid), any subject can be recognized by the 
chair (experimenter) to offer a feasible alternative as a proposed change in the 
status quo. If this motion is seconded, the alternative is put to a majority vote 
against the status quo, with the winner becoming the new status quo. This process 
is repeated until some subject makes a motion to adjourn that is seconded and 
approved by a majority. Fiorina and Plott consider four experimental contexts, 
distinguished by two variables: High versus low payoffs, and experiments in which 
subjects could discuss alternatives after motions are seconded versus experiments in 
which all discussion is precluded. (In all of the experiments that we review, to 
insure that it is the spatial dimensions and not mere monetary rewards that are the 
"issues" under consideration, subjects are prohibited from revealing anything about 
the cardinal nature of their payoffs or from devising schemes for dividing their 
winnings at the termination of an experiment.) Figure l a  summarizes the final 
outcomes of the "high payoff" experiments; Figure 1 b reports the "low payoff" 
outcomes (no general pattern of significant differences between the "with 
communication" and "without communication" is apparent in their data). 
One reaction to these data is that, because only a minority of outcomes 
correspond to the Condorcet point, we ought to reject the simple hypothesis that 
"Cooperative majority rule committees choose Condorcet winners if such a winner 
exists." On the other hand, we can see that most outcomes -- at least for the high 
8 
payoff experiments are "close" to the Condorcet point in terms of Euclidean 
distance, and that this point appears to serve as a important focus for most 
committees. Indeed, Figure 2b summarizes the outcomes of a procedurally equivalent 
series of experiments using committees with from twenty three to forty five subjects 
(Plott 1977). Figure 2a shows the distribution of ideal points for the largest 
committee. Six of nine outcomes now correspond identically to the core. Hence, the 
deviations that Figures l a  and lb report may be merely the artifact of a small 
experimental committee (which are magnified by decreasing the subjects' monetary 
incentives). 
There are, however, some aspects to the details of Fiorina and Plott's 
procedures that warrant emphasis. First, the method whereby subjects are recognized 
to make motions appears to place the experimenter in too central a role. Do 
subjects perceive the recognition rule as random or as biased towards particular 
subjects, such as those who have not previously made a motion? Second, because 
subjects do not know each other's preferences (even ordinally), it is more 
appropriate to describe the corresponding game-form as a game of incomplete 
information. Our concern here is the fact that with incomplete information, other 
institutions occasion seemingly perverse predictions about Condorcet winners 
(Ordeshook and Palfrey 1988) and there is no guarantee, a priori, that Fiorina and 
Plott's procedure avoids such possibilities. Third, the game-form implied by a 
sequential parliamentary procedure should be modeled, since that form need not 
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correspond to one in which we predict a Condorcet winner. Indeed, coupled with the 40 
subjects' incomplete information, we can speculate that the predictions rendered by 
a carefully drawn (and probably intractable) model of the situation will include but 
will not be limited to the Condorcet point. In a series of finite-alternative 
experiments, however, Salant and Goodstein (1987) confront many of these issues 
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directly with a revised parliamentary procedure. Their conclusion that "committees 
... are much more likely to select the Condorcet point when "high intensity" 
preferences are used (p. I 7)," nevertheless, reaffirms Fiorina and Plott's 
conclusions, although they accept the necessity for introducing the notion of a 
threshold in order to explain deviations from predicted outcomes. 
The objections to Fiorina and Plott's procedure are summarized by the concern 
that the implied noncooperative extensive-form game of incomplete information is not 
known to yield a Condorcet winner as an equilibrium outcome. Rather than revise 
this procedure incrementaly so that we can deduce predicted outcomes directly from 
its game-form, however, Berl et al (1976) report on a series of experiments using 
the preference configuration in Figure 3 in which a procedure is implemented that 
attempts to approximate the rules identifying a cooperative extensive form game as 
closely as possible (although this essay has a earlier publication date than that of 
Fiorina and Plott, the inspiration for this research came from earlier drafts of 
Fiorina and Plott's essay). In this instance, subjects are informed about each 
other's ordinal preferences, and in lieu of a specific parliamentary procedure, 
subjects can discuss alternatives freely, without interference from the 
experimenter. And any majority at any time is free to end the experiment after 
reaching an agreement. The data that Figure 3 portrays strengthens Fiorina and 
Plott's conclusions about the attractiveness of the core. 
One objection to both the Fiorina-Plott and Berl et al experiments, 
nevertheless, is that with circular indifference contours, the Condorcet winner is 
necessarily "central" -- the distribution of ideal points must be radially symmetric 
so that the Condorcet winner corresponds to the ideal point that lies on the 
intersection of the straight lines connecting the ideals of diametrically opposite 
voters (assuming that at most one voter's ideal is at the presumed Condorcet point). 
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Thus, such a point may be chosen because it is deemed equitable by subjects or 
because it is a "natural" focal point. Fiorina and Plott, however, also report on 
experiments using elliptical indifference contours, and the results (see Figure 4) 
corroborate their earlier conclusions.* For a more dramatic asymmetry in the 
location of the core with respect to ideal points, Berl et al provide a series of 
three-person experiments in which city-block utility functions are induced, and in 
which, with an appropriate rotation of the axes, the core gives the appearance of 
benefitting one or two specific subjects and thus does not appear to be equitable. 
Figures 5a and 5b summarize their results. Finally, Figure 6 summarizes the 
outcomes of some experiments reported by Plott (1978, 1979) using the Fiorina-Plott 
procedures applied to rhomboid indifference contours with the orientations shown in 
the figure. In general, all of these variations confirm the attractiveness of the 
core as a solution hypothesis. 
Although we might quibble about the procedural dissimilarities in these 
experiments, there is a more serious issue concerning the special role of Euclidean 
preferences and spatial alternative sets. The experimental data that we have 
reviewed thus far supports the hypothesis that if preferences and alternatives are 
spatial, if a Condorcet winner exists, and if procedures imply a game-form (or 
"approximate game form") that links this winner to the core, then that winner is the 
final outcome, either identically or approximately. McKelvey and Ordeshook (1981), 
however, offer a series of finite-alternative core experiments in which with one 
preference configuration the core is selected less than half the time whereas with 
another configuration the core is selected every time (see also Eavey and Miller, 
* This figure and Figure 7b are drawn according to the reported data since in each 
case one observation in the original figure is inconsistent with that data. 
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1984b). A variety of straightforward hypotheses (e.g., considerations of equity, 
indifference to payoff magnitudes, the experience of subjects, and the completeness 
of information) fail to explain this discrepancy. These experiments, then, raise 
the question as to whether spatial configurations with Condorcet winners can be 
found that will yield equivalent discrepancies. Thus, we must ask: Is the support 
that the core receives in the Fiorina-Plott and Berl et al experiments an artifact 
of the fortuitous selection of ideal point configurations, or is there something 
special about spatial representations? The first part of this question can only be 
"answered" by additional experimentation, although the evidence to date strongly 
suggests that the core's support in spatial experiments is not an artifact. The 
second part suggests that there is a missing element to our explanations of 
experimental outcomes -- that a satisfactory explanation must also tells us why 
people react to a spatial structure differently than they react to other topological 
representations of alternatives and preferences. 
Despite these caveats, experimental research supports the prediction that, at 
least in alternative sets with a spatial structure, the core (Condorcet winner) of a 
committee game emerges as the final outcome. Indeed, because they employ different 
procedures, the comparison of the Fiorina-Plott with the Berl et al experiments 
suggests (but does not establish) that this prediction is robust to slight 
variations in procedural details. As further evidence for this suggestion, McKelvey 
and Ordeshook (1984) offer a series of experiments that graft an important variation 
of the Fiorina-Plott parliamentary procedure onto their own design. Specifically, 
these experiments use an identical parliamentary procedure in which subjects must 
formally make motions to change the status quo, and so forth, with the exception 
that a motion can differ from the status quo on only one issue. That is, voting 
must proceed "issue-by-issue" with the opportunity to reconsider issues in any 
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sequence. And as before, two types of experiments are considered: Those that allow 
discussion and those that preclude discussion among subjects. Thus, agreements to 
trade votes across issues implicitly (as is possible in the Fiorina-Plott 
experiments via the opportunity to make motions that differ from the status quo on 
both issues simultaneously) or explicitly are prohibited in the first case but not 
in the second. Theoretically, however, we know that if preferences are 
characterized by simple Euclidean distance, then regardless of whether voters are 
sincere or strategic, and regardless of whether discussion is or is not permitted, 
the core and the Condorcet winner remain equivalent (Kramer 1972). Figure 7a and 7b 
plot the results of these experiments with discussion permitted and with it not 
permitted. Generally, this data can be seen to support the theoretical prediction 
of the core and the insensitivity of this prediction to possibilities for 
communication. 
3. Condorcet Winners in Simple Elections 
Turning now to elections, it is surprising how little experimental research 
there is to report here even though our prediction -- that candidates will converge 
to a Condorcet point if it exists -- is identical to the prediction that we make in 
the committee setting. McKelvey and Ordeshook (19S2) provide a series of two-
candidate, two-dimensional elections with a Condorcet winner -- the same preference 
configuration as the one shown in Figures 7a and 7b -- and, thus, with a unique Nash 
equilibrium for the corresponding two-candidate zero sum game. In these 
experiments, however, only the candidates are subjects -- voters are artificial 
actors that simply vote for the candidate closest to their ideal. Each experiment 
consists of a sequence of trials in which the same two subjects choose strategies 
after observing each other's previous choice and the electoral outcome. Figures Sa 
and Sb summarize the candidates' choices in the first 5 and last 5 trials, and they 
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100 
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document the convergence of choices to the Condorcet point. 
In the preceding experiments, the subjects (candidates) are perfectly informed 
about the preferences of each member of the electorate, and the simulated electorate 
is assumed to be informed about the candidates' issue positions -- the voters choose 
on the basis of the candidates' actual strategies. In reality, of course, 
electorates typically are poorly informed about the policies that candidates will 
implement if elected, and candidates may have only noisy data about voter 
preferences. As a partial response to such considerations, Plott (1977) offers a 
series of ten experiments in which candidates are uninformed about the preferences 
of voters (the number of voters varies in these experiments between nineteen and 
forty one). Voters know the positions of the candidates and candidates are allowed 
to query the electorate about preferred directions of change (e.g. "How many would 
like me to move to the point _?"). Also, a poll is conducted periodically in which 
the electorate is asked "If the election were held now, how many would vote for ?" 
Although Plott does not show that voting sincerely in the polls is a dominant 
strategy, if we assume that this is so, then each candidates' equilibrium strategy 
corresponds to the Condorcet point. Figure 2a shows the distribution of ideal 
points for the largest experiment, and Figure 9 shows the final experimental 
outcomes. 
These experiments, however, do not confront perhaps the most important feature 
of information in elections -- the low levels of information of voters. 
Correspondingly, a series of theoretical results by McKelvey and Ordeshook, in 
conjunction with a series of experimental tests of those results, ascertain the 
robustness of spatial election theory to such incomplete information. We cannot 
review the details of their theoretical analyses here (for a more comprehensive 
review see McKelvey and Ordeshook 1985b, 1987). Briefly, those analyses develop two 
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general classes of models. The first model applies ideas taken from the rational 
expectations theory of markets to hypothesize that voters use a variety of readily 
available cues, such as public opinion polls and interest group endorsements, to 
estimate which candidate in a unidimensional or multidimensional spatial environment 
is closest to their ideal point. Specifically, the electorate is assumed to consist 
of both informed and uninformed voters, where informed voters know the candidates' 
issue positions (in the unidimensional case some portion of informed voters can 
correspond to a unitary actor that simply endorses the candidate closest to its 
ideal point), and uninformed voters must rely on cues -- endorsements and public 
opinion polls of the entire electorate -- to make their decisions. 
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985b) report on two unidimensional experiments. In 
these experiments, each of which consist of a series of eight elections, candidates 
are completely uninformed about voter preferences. Each election begins with the 
selection of issue positions by the two candidates, followed by two polls of the 
electorate in which voters must identify the candidate they think they most prefer, 
followed by a vote to determine that election's winner. Half of the electorate 
(plus one) is told the candidates' strategies in each election, whereas each of the 
remaining voters is told (1) which candidate is to the left and which is to the 
right on the issue (via the interest group endorsement); (2) the outcome of each 
poll; and (3) the location of his or her ideal point relative to the entire 
electorate (e.g., whether it falls in the 30th percentile, counting from the left, 
the 35th percentile, etc.). Theoretically, this information is sufficient for the 
realization of a rational expectations equilibrium in which candidates converge to 
the electorate's median preference and all voters vote as if they had complete 
information about the candidates. 
In the actual experimental data uninformed voters vote "correctly," given their 
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information, 84.9 percent of the time; and Figures IOa and IOb, which graph the 
candidates' choices in each election, document their rapid convergence to the 
electorate's median preference. It appears, then, that the Median Voter Theorem, 
given an appropriate structure to incomplete information, is robust to such 
information. However, McKelvey and Ordeshook also report on a series of two-
dimensional experiments, run an average of nine election periods, that are far less 
conclusive. From the perspective of uninformed voters, the details of these 
experiments differ from their unidimensional counterparts .as follows: there is no 
interest group rendering an endorsement, the electorate is divided into three groups 
--each consisting of informed and uninformed subparts -- a poll within each group is 
reported to the electorate, and each voter is told the position of his or her ideal 
point relative to the median preference within each group. Despite these changes, 
which are necessitated by the theoretical model, uninformed voters vote correctly 
85.5 percent of the time. Only three of the six candidates, however, can be said to 
have converged to positions close to the overall median (see McKelvey and Ordeshook 
1985a for a detailed analysis of the data). 
We can hypothesize, of course, that multidimensional contests (as compared to 
unidimensional ones) present candidates with a sufficiently difficult decision 
environment so that even several election outcomes do not allow them to judge the 
directions in which they ought to move their issue positions (since 60-90 subjects 
are required to implement the experimental design, each experiment requires 3-4 
hours to administer, which precludes additional trials). Thus, we can also 
conjecture that if the experiments are run longer, the candidates would converge 
that additional data on victories and defeats would decrease the degrees of freedom 
that candidates have for choosing strategies. This conjecture, however, remains 
merely an unsubstantiated speculation. 
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Although subjects participate in a sequence of experiments so that they can 
learn to process the information made available to them, McKelvey and Ordeshook's 
first theoretical model in fact focuses on a single election and on the value to 
voters of cues that arise in a campaign. Much of the empirical literature on 
voting, however, suggests that voters vote retrospectively. Briefly, the 
traditional retrospective voting hypothesis is that, in lieu of any knowledge about 
policies advocated by candidates and implemented by incumbents, voters know only 
their stream of income or welfare (c.f., Key 1966; Fiorina 1981). The empirical 
question, then, is whether retrospective voting in a spatial context generates 
signals that lead incumbents to implement Condorcet winners as policy. A second 
model and series of experiments is developed, then, which only permit voters to 
choose retrospectively (Collier et al 1987; Grey et al 1986). 
In this second set of experiments, each subject that plays the role of a voter 
is assigned a spatial utility function (simple Euclidean distance in either one or 
two dimensions) that is not revealed to anyone. Instead, the incumbent (initially 
selected at random) chooses a spatial position that is translated, via the assigned 
utility functions, into a payoff and it is this payoff only that is revealed to each: 
voter. Voters must then choose between reelecting the current incumbent and 
electing the challenger. Notice that with this procedure, a challenger does not 
adopt a policy until he or she becomes an incumbent. Thus, election campaigns are 
nonexistent, voters must act on the basis of the past stream of payoffs associated 
with the two potential incumbents, and the sole source of information available to 
candidates is the history of spatial positions adopted by incumbents and the votes 
those spatial positions earned incumbents. 
Evaluating voting behavior in this context is difficult. The absence of 
structure in each experiment means that there are a great many alternative decision 
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rules that voters could reasonably employ (e.g., vote to reelect the incumbent if 
the incumbent's policy yields a payoff greater than the discounted average of the 
past, or greater than the discounted average of the challenger's past, or if the 
payoff is no worse than the payoff from the previous incumbent, etc.). But with 
respect to the more important question of what policies incumbents choose, these 
experiments suggest that, despite the limited information available to subjects, 
Condorcet winning spatial positions remain powerfully attractive to the candidates. 
Looking at both the unidimensional and the two-dimensional experiments, Table 1 
reports the results of the simple regression y = a + bx + e, where x is the location 
of the electorate's median preference and y is the actual position adopted by the 
incumbent (in the case of two dimensions, each dimension is treated as a separate 
source of data for the regression). Notice that if incumbents converge identically 
to the median, then we would have a = 0 and b = 1. The data that this table reports 
shows that such perfect convergence does not occur, but they confirm that, on 
average, the candidates do approach the median as the experiment proceeds. 
Table 1: Estimates of Regression 
a b R2 
Unidimensional 
periods 1-5 39.3 (2.91) .21 (.05) .06 (15.5) 
periods 11-15 22.0 (2.75) .59 (.05) .37 (14.6) 
last 5 periods 17.0 (2.67) .69 (.05) .52 (12.5) 
Two-dimensional 
periods 1-5 45.4 (4.14) .06 (.07) .00 (21.7) 
periods 11-15 15.8 (2.46) .64 (.04) .56 (13.0) 
periods 21'-25 15.8 (2.58) .67 (.04) .56 (13.5) 
periods 35-40 11.2 (2.38) .77 (.04) .66 (12.5) 
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At least for the limited information structure imposed by these experiments, 
then, the Condorcet winner remains attractive to candidates. This does not mean 
that the sole sufficient condition for the medjan's attraction is that it merely 
exist. The experiments reviewed in this section support the proposition that, 
experimentally, candidates will converge to equilibrium strategies -- that the 
definition of rational choice offered by noncooperative game theory has empirical 
foundation. But we cannot conclude that Condorcet winners prevail if the 
situation's game form is changed so that equilibrium strategies correspond to 
something other than that winner. Consider, for example, the fact noted earlier 
that even if an election is unidimensional or if the distribution of ideal points is 
radially symmetric, equilibrium strategies in general cannot correspond to the 
Condorcet winner if there are more than two candidates. The experimental evidence 
that Figure 11 summarizes supports this view. This figure shows the positions of 
victorious candidates in a series of three-candidate elections (Plott 1977), and 
although the data is near the Condorcet winner, a comparison of Figures 11 and 9 
reveals that outcomes are more dispersed in three-candidate elections than in their 
two-candidate counterparts. Thus, the mere addition of a candidate changes 
equilibrium strategies, that this change is reflected in the experimental data. 
3. Elections without Pure Strategy Equilibria 
Much of the early research on spatial election models focused on sufficient 
conditions for the existence of readily identifiable pure equilibrium strategies for 
candidates. Indeed, owing to the obsession of this research with uncovering such 
conditions, it is safe to infer that many scholars believed at the time that little 
could be said about political outcomes if such strategies did not exist. However, 
beginning with McKelvey and Ordeshook's (1976) development of the admissable set and 
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Kramer's (1977) application of the minmax set, and proceeding to the formulation and 
application of the uncovered set (Miller 1980), we now have good theoretical reasons 
for supposing that candidates in two-candidate elections without a Condorcet winning 
platform will not diverge "much" from the median voter preference on each spatial 
dimension (for specific bounds on the divergence see McKelvey 1987). The uncovered 
set is especially important in this regards since all strategies outside of it are 
necessarily dominated by strategies- within it, in which case the support set of 
mixed strategy equilibria must fall within the uncovered set. 
As an initial test of these ideas, McKelvey and Ordeshook (1982) offer a series 
of five- and nine-voter; two-candidate experiments. Figures 12a and 12b summarize 
the choices of candidates in the first and last five rounds of the five-voter 
experiments; Figures 12c and 12d summarize the nine-voter experiments (recall that 
the voters here are artificial and that only candidates are actual subjects). Three 
important conclusions are evident from these data. First, the candidates' 
strategies are not scattered randomly across the entire issue space; rather, they 
are constrained for the most part to Pareto-optimal positions. Second, the 
dispersion of positions decreases as the experiments proceed. Although the 
candidates do not appear to be converging to a specific point (compare these figures 
with Figure 8b), there is an evident tendency for candidates to select positions 
near the "middle" of the space -- positions that fall generally in the support set 
of a mixed strategy solution to the game. Finally, the dispersion of positions is 
less with nine voters than with five voters. Hence, since, in general, the size of 
the uncovered set decreases as the density of ideal points increases, these data are 
consistent with the hypothesis that candidates are attracted to positions within 
this set. 
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4. Unrestricted Majority Rule and Committees without cores 
Although there are sound reasons for supposing that the description of mixed 
minmax strategies drawn from a static description of an election is of limited 
empirical relevance owing to the sequential nature of campaigns, the uncovered set 
itself is important because it places limits on undominated spatial positions. This 
fact, in turn, provides a theoretical basis for supposing that candidates will not 
"wander too far." But matters are far less clear for cooperative committees without 
cores. Although we can show that various cooperative solution concepts such as the 
V -set necessarily predict outcomes that are uncovered, our confidence in these 
concepts does not equal our confidence in the core or in the hypothesis that people 
will not choose dominated alternatives. Consequently, experimental research into 
cooperative spatial committees without cores serves more of an exploratory function 
-- testing tentative ideas and suggesting alternative approaches. Unfortunately, 
owing to the specific concerns of individual researchers, this research comprises 
something less than a well integrated experimental package. Indeed, procedures 
often are incomparable even though the experimental evidence suggests that 
variations in these procedures may be of profound significance. 
One model of cooperative spatial committees without cores is McKelvey, 
Ordeshook, and Winer's (1978) competitive solution. Briefly, the invention of 
competitive solution is a response, first, to the fact that concepts such as the 
main-simple V-set and the various bargaining sets are typically empty for spatial 
games without cores, and second, to the unreasonableness of the supposition that the 
absence of a core implies "chaos" in simple majority rule institutions. To test 
this solution hypothesis, McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer offer a series of spatial 
experiments in which: subjects are told the ideal points of other players, and 
everyone knows that all indifference contours are circles; free and open discussion 
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is permitted -- no specific parliamentary voting mechanism is employed -- with the 
sole prohibition that subjects cannot reveal their actual monetary payoffs; and an 
experiment ends when some majority indicates that it has reached an agreement, and 
the members of that majority sign a document to that effect. Figure 13 reports the 
outcomes of six experimental sessions. Similarly, Figures 14a through 14d report on 
a series of sixty experiments reported by Ordeshook and Winer (1980) that use 
weighted voting (the weights are the numbers beside each committee member's ideal 
point). In general, these data support the competitive solution and thereby 
disconfirm the supposition that the absence of the core implies chaos. 
Laing and Olmstead (1978) report on a series of spatial experiments that use 
different configurations of ideal point but identical procedures with one exception 
-- subjects play a sequence of otherwise independent games. Their results, then, 
are difficult to interpret because of the possibility of multiple-trial agreements 
among subjects. Indeed, Laing and Olmstead exclude two experimental sessions out of 
1 9  from their analysis owing to explicit agreements to choose successively the ideal 
points of different players. With this qualification in mind, Figure 15 summarizes 
the outcomes from one of their preference configurations. This particular 
configuration is especially interesting because it does not appear to yield a 
competitive solution, and thus serves as a counter-example to the conjecture that 
this solution exists in general for all simple games. To the extent that the 
outcomes in Figure 15 are close to an "approximate" solution, then, suggests that 
although the competitive solution captures essential features of bargaining with 
spatial preferences, this concept either needs refinement or that a new hypothesis 
must be formulated that is consistent with the competitive solution's predictions. 
Laing and Olmstead raise a theoretical problem for the competitive solution in 
particular, but with a series of finite alternative (non-spatial) experiments 
22 
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designed to discriminate among cooperative game-theoretic solution hypotheses, 
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1983) show that this solution need not predict outcomes. In 
fact, the data they report suggest that the cardinality of utility plays an 
important role in the patterns of outcomes. Miller and Oppenheimer (1982) attempt a 
systematic study of the effects of the cardinality of preferences, and they also 
show that cardinality affects the performance of the competitive solution. It is 
evident, then, that much critical theorizing remains before any definitive 
conclusions can be reached concerning the specific outcomes that prevail in a 
cooperative environment. 
The experimental evidence on cooperative games without cores, then, yields the 
following general conclusions. First, the absence of a core does not imply 
incoherence or chaos -- there are patterns to the data that warrant explanation. 
Second, "classical" solution hypotheses such as the V-set and the various bargaining
sets are, as presently formulated, wholly inadequate. Third, the competitive 
solution captures an important feature of bargaining and coalition formation, but, 
for theoretical reasons, it cannot be regarded as a satisfactory general hypothesis. 
Finally, although the distribution of outcomes is somewhat sensitive to the 
cardinality of preferences when the core is not empty (cf. Salant and Goodstein 
1987), cardinality appears to be more important when the core is empty. 
5. Committees and the Consequences of Institutions 
The experiments that the previous section reviews concern a particular 
institution -- unrestricted majority rule -- but it represents merely one 
institution drawn from a potentially infinite variety that might describe actual 
political systems. And alternative institutions can have significant theoretical 
consequences: They can change the nature of the core, they can induce a non-empty 
core for cases in which no such equilibrium exists under unrestricted majority rule, 
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or they can render the core empty. An especially graphic illustration of the first 
possibility is offered by Kormendi and Plott (1982). Using a preference 
configuration and procedures that match the open-discussion experiments of Fiorina 
and Plott (1978) but which employ a non-monetary preference inducement mechanism 
(student grades were dependent on their performance as subjects), Figure 16a reports 
the results of seven experimental outcomes, all clustered tightly about the core. 
In Figure 16b, however, voter 4 is the only subject allowed to make motions. Hence, 
voter 4 must be a member of any coalition to upset the status quo, in which case the 
core corresponds to all outcomes that lie on the dashed line connecting 4's ideal 
point to the original core. Similarly, in Figure 16c, voter 4's role is given to 
voter 5 so that the core now corresponds to the dashed line shown there. Figure 
l 6c especially shows how this simple procedural variation, by changing the core, 
changes the pattern of outcomes. 
Laing and Slotznick (1987a) consider a different mechanism for inducing a 
nonempty core -- four-fifths majority rule. Referring to the five-person preference 
configuration in Figure 17, the interior hatched quadrilateral (called the 
"heartland" by Laing and Slotznick) corresponds to those points that are Pareto 
optimal for every winning coalition (every coalition with four or five members). 
Under simple majority rule, such points, if they exist, correspond to the core, 
whereas for the particular preference configuration in this figure, simple majority 
rule yields an empty core (indeed, this Figure depicts Laing and Olmstead's example 
of a spatial game with no competitive solution). With unusual majorities, however, 
we cannot identify a core without referring to a status quo point, since we must 
also identify the outcomes that blocking coalitions can ensure. Suppose, then, that 
the point s' is the status quo. The two "lenses" attached to this point denote the 
alternatives that defeat s' under four-fifths rule, and the intersection of these 
24 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
X 4 
X3 
tj.sx1 = core
• One observation 
+ Two observations 
Two observations at x1 
X5 
o.._��'--��..___._�_.___._�_._��....1-__..__-'-��-'-��--'-��--'
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 20 40 � 80 00 � � � 180
FIGURE ISa: No Ac;iendo-Setter ( Kormendi-Plott 1982 l 
X3 
• I 
I 
'l I 
I 
I 
I 
X4 
I 
11-..,S- core 
X5 
O L-��-'---'-�-'-��-'-�'---'-��-'-��_.��--'��---''--�--' 
0 20 40 � 80 00 � � � � 
FIGURE 16b : Voter 4 as Ac;iendo-Setter ( Kormendi-Pl ott 1982) 
120 
X 4 
100 
80 
60 
X3 o.��--?core
--- -,.. - ... _ - - -
40 
X5 
20 one observation at 1.1 
0 '-�� ........ ��-'-��-'-��-'-��-'-�...____...��_..��__.J'--�--' 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 
FIGUR E 16c: Voter 5 os Ac;iendo- Setter l Kormendi- Plott 19821 
lenses with the heartland is the core of the corresponding game. If these lenses 
fail to intersect the the hatched region, as is the case with a status quo at s",
the core is empty. Hence, theoretically, we predict outcomes "near" or in the 
intersections of these lenses with the heartland when the status quo is s'; and 
although there is no specific prediction for this game when there is no core, we 
should anticipate a wider dispersion of outcomes when the status quo at s". 
Laing and Slotznick report on ten experiments using the preference 
configuration in Figure 17, as well as two other configurations, in conjunction with 
the open discussion procedures that McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer (1978) apply to 
their test of the competitive solution. Figure 17 reports their data, where x's 
denote outcomes with the status quo at s' and o's denote outcomes with the status 
quo at s". In this instance, it is apparent that the evidence is merely suggestive 
and not conclusive. The x's do in fact tend to cluster more strongly than the o's, 
but only one x is in the core itself. The particular feature of Laing and 
Slotznick's procedure, however, that may account for these discrepancies is the one 
we cite earlier: namely, subjects play a series of experiments and are thereby 
allowed the opportunity to reach multi-trial agreements. Indeed, two experimental 
series are deleted from the study owing to the explicit appearance of such an 
agreement. Grether et al (1981), for example, report on a series of single-trial 
experiments using unanimity rule that strongly support the theoretical prediction 
that unanimity renders the status quo the unique core outcome. Laing and Sloztnick 
(1987b), on the other hand, describe a series of unanimity experiments in which, 
although the core preforms better that all other hypotheses considered, sharp 
deviations from the core are evident. Again, though, they employ a procedure in 
which subjects play a sequence of games in which multi-trial agreements are 
possible. 
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The role that a status quo plays depends, of course, on the procedural choice 
context. In Laing and Slotznick's experiments, that role is determined by the four-
fifths voting requirement. An alternative possibility is that committees proceed by 
an endogenously determined agenda in which the status quo enters the agenda, as in 
the Fiorina-Plott experiments, as the first motion to be voted on (forward agendas), 
or as the alternative entered in the agenda's final stage (backward agendas). In a 
forward agenda, the status quo, theoretically at least, should play little role in 
the final outcome, whereas in the backward agenda, only outcomes that defeat the 
status quo should be selected. Wilson ( 1986) documents this fact in a series of 
experiments played by subjects, without discussion, over computer terminals. 
Figures 18a and 18b summarize his findings and show that with a backward agenda, 
outcomes always fall in the lenses that correspond to alternatives that defeat the 
status quo; but with forward agendas, no such pattern is evident. 
By precluding the possibility of direct communication and discussion, Wilson 
ensures that the agenda formed by a decentralized and computerized process is 
adhered to by committee members. Unfortunately, we have little theoretical 
knowledge about optimal strategies for endogenous agenda setting (for some results, 
see McKelvey 1986) and thus we cannot interpret further the dispersion of outcomes 
that Figure 18b reports. We can, however, offer one speculation: If communication 
and coordination are allowed, other aspects of procedural structure should be lees 
influential. Correspondingly, McKelvey and Ordeshook (1984) study a different 
procedural variant that induces a stable point for a preference configuration that 
does not yield a core under unrestricted majority rule. 
Theoretically, if voting proceeds issue-by-issue without discussion, and if 
indifference contours are circles, then the unique stable point is the issue-by-
issue median (Kramer, 1 972). Figures 19a and 19b summarize the outcomes of the 
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( Wilson 1986) 
experiments designed to test this hypothesis. The procedures adopted here 
correspond identically to those that Fiorina and Plott use when subjects are not 
allowed to hold any discussion, with the exception that motions can differ from the 
status quo on only one dimension. The comparison of these figures with the data 
that Figure 13 reports when unrestricted majority rule is in force reveals the 
influence on outcomes of an issue-by-issue constraint. Notice in particular, that 
unlike the experimental outcomes that prevail with unrestricted discussion (see 
Figure 13), nearly all outcomes here lie in the interior pentagon of the figures. 
Further, when preferences are rotated so as to move the location of the issue-by-
issue median, the mean outcome tracks that point (compare Figures 19a and 19b). 
The theoretical prediction that follows from Kramer's analysis supposes that 
committee members cannot communicate to form binding agreements. If such agreements 
are allowed, then the issue-by-issue procedural context as well as the specific
orientation of ideal points in the space become theoretically irrelevant, and the 
committee is effectively acting under unrestricted majority rule. With this 
argument in mind, McKelvey and Ordeshook also report on an experimental series that 
requires issue-by-issue voting, but which permits subjects to discuss matters freely 
prior to each vote. Figures 20a and 20b summarize their results, and the comparison 
of these data to the data in Figures 13, and Figures 18a and 18b is informative. 
Specifically, notice that the dispersion of outcomes in Figures 20a and 20b falls 
somewhere between the dispersion in Figure 13 and the dispersions in Figure 19a and 
19b, and the mean outcome moves away from the issue-by-issue stable point. The 
inference drawn from these data is that as the constraints on the imposition of a 
procedure such as issue-by-issue voting are relaxed -- as the costs of reverting to 
unrestricted majority rule are decreased majority coalitions that find it in 
their interest to bypass restrictive procedures will in fact bypass them. And if 
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these costs are zero, outcomes should follow the pattern in Figure 13. 
6. Conclusions 
It has been slightly more than ten years since Fiorina and Plott and Berl et al 
published their experimental results about cores and Condorcet winners. This 
research and the research proceeding from it tells us, first, that the concept of 
the core, at least in the context of spatial preferences and majority rule, is 
predictive for a wide range. of institutions. Second, the Condorcet winner as an 
equilibrium strategy for candidates in two-candidate elections has impressive 
credentials as a predictive concept. There are disquieting notes to be sure, such 
as those finite alternative experiments in which cores are not chosen by subjects. 
But the experiments run to date leave no doubt that the development of political and 
economic theory must heed the definition of rational action encapsulated by these 
concepts. 
Although experimental research gives us confidence in our theoretical research 
in situations in which a core exists, it can make a more impressive contribution. 
With the discovery that Condorcet winners are rare with spatial preferences and that 
cyclic social preferences can extend across the entire space of feasible 
alternatives (McKelvey 1976, 1979), some scholars were led to the belief that 
political processes are inherently unstable and unpredictable (Riker 1984). Others, 
believing that only the possibility of rendering unique predictions is removed if a 
game's core is empty, and the like, began the development of alternative equilibrium 
notions such as the uncovered set and the competitive solution. Experimental 
research supports this second view. Additionally, it has guided the development of 
new equilibrium concepts, and has led us to reject outright ideas such as the V-set 
and the bargaining set, and to seriously question the generality of alternative 
cooperative solution hypotheses such as the competitive solution. 
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Finally, experimental research contributes in a natural way to our 
understanding of the role of procedures and institutions in economic and political 
processes. Experimental research, by its very nature, is intimately involved with 
institutional design. Every set of instructions and every variable considered in 
the implementation of an experiment, is an aspect of institutional design, which 
renders the experimentalist especially sensitive to institutions and their 
implications. Not unsuprisingly, then, experimental research, taken as a whole, 
gives us a view of the sensitivity and insensitivity of outcomes to alternative 
formal and informal procedures. The data, for example, suggest that knowledge about 
the preferences of others plays little if any role in committees with unrestricted 
majority rule; procedures such as issue-by-issue voting can restrict outcomes and 
induce stability, but only to the extent that those procedures also limit the 
ability of committee members to communicate directly and negotiate agreements; the 
requirement that only unusual majorities can modify the status quo works in a 
theoretically proscribed way; theoretical predictions work better in larger 
committees; and the theory of two-candidate elections is robust to important forms 
of incomplete information. 
Experimentation also makes us sensitive to procedural effects about which we 
know little theoretically. For example, Hoffman and Plott (1983) suggest that 
formal procedures can significantly effect the consequences of informal pre-meeting 
discussions. Quoting their conclusion at length, they surmise that "If the rule is 
simple majority, with no Robert's Rules provisions, the coalitions formed during the 
pre-meeting discussions simply vote in the agreed alternative with very little 
discussion or debate. Under the Robert's Rules provisions which can for discussions 
and the orderly submission of amendments, the proposal advanced by the pre-formed 
coalition is immediately challenged by amendment. During the ensuing discussion 
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information is generated which reveals the potential advantages of other possibly 
successful motions ... It seems that the institutional arrangements foster a search 
and informational gathering activity (p. 34)." 
In summary, then, the experimental research that this essay reviews gives us 
considerable confidence that the large body of theoretical research into spatial 
models of committees and elections is not without sound empirical content. 
Certainly, those models may have to be elaborated before we can apply them directly 
to the study of, for example, the U.S. Congress, Parliaments, and actual elections. 
But those same experiments, in addition to revealing fruitful avenues of opportunity 
for the theorist, also suggest how theoretical models can be adapted to environments 
outside of the laboratory. 
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